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While many studies look at the impact of trade on the supply side, notably through its impact 
on international vertical specialization and global supply chains, fewer papers examine how 
import penetration affects aggregate demand. The increased import intensity of aggregate 
demand has been a feature of the globalization process until the 2008–2009 financial crisis. 
Since then, the import / trade intensity of some aggregate demand components seems to have 
behaved differently. Using input / output tables for almost forty countries accounting for the 
bulk of global trade, this paper calculates the import intensity of aggregate demand over the 
period 1995–2014. The most pro-cyclical components of aggregate demand, i.e. investment, 
exports, and private consumption, are also found to be most import intensive; net government 
expenditures are less so. The most import intensive demand component of all is investment, 
which globally has an import content of 37 %. Unsurprisingly, investment is the only aggregate 
demand component that, by 2014, had not recovered to its pre-crisis level, a reason that might 
explain the relative slowdown of trade since the end of the financial crisis, for any given level 
of import intensity. Further, import intensity of investment seemed to have leveled off, if not 
fallen, in some emerging market economies. While the phenomenon is not long enough to be 
examined in detail, this is a change which might affect the pace of trade globalization.
Keywords: international trade, investment, trade policy, business cycles, global supply chains. 
Introduction
In the past two decades, the expansion of trade has been significantly larger than 
overall economic activity, almost by a factor of 2 during its periods of fastest growth — in 
1 The article is written on the basis of the report presented by the author during international con-
ference “Evolution of International Trading System: Prospects and Challenges” (St. Petersburg, Faculty of 
Economics SPSU, October 26–27, 2017).
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the late 1990’s and early 2000’s. The relationship between trade and economic activity has 
been looked at from the point of view of the supply side, that is, imports and GDP. This 
approach is justified as it highlights the impact of trade on the overall economy, which 
takes place mainly through the change in the allocation of resources and the productivity 
impact of import competition. From the perspective of national accounts, imports come 
in addition to GDP, in order to account for the overall supply of an economy. From a 
global supply perspective, though, imports equal exports. Hence trade has no accounting 
impact in increasing GDP other than through the resource allocation and productivity 
effects described above. 
However, from a macroeconomic perspective, traded goods are an element of de-
mand for the produced goods of any one country. Exports are the part of demand ad-
dressed by foreign residents, while domestic consumption, fixed gross capital formation 
and net government expenditures form domestic demand. Still, with the opening up of 
economies, the import content of domestic demand has also increased in recent years, 
both in developed and developing and emerging economies. Hence, cyclical or structural 
developments affecting aggregate demand locally and globally affect the demand for trad-
ed goods as well, through their import content. 
This paper aims at calculating the import content of elements of demand through 
the use of input-output tables at the national level, and to examine the evolution of its 
most trade-intensive components, with a view to offer a new perspective on recent trends 
of global trade. It builds on an analysis of input / output tables for almost 40 countries 
accounting for the bulk of world trade, by calculating the import intensity of aggregate 
demand over a full economic cycle (1995–2014), that is a cycle characterized by economic 
expansion, recession, and recovery. 
The paper finds that the investment, exports and private consumption are, respec-
tively, also the most import intensive components of aggregate demand; net government 
expenditures are less so. The most import intensive demand component of all components 
of aggregate demand is investment (that is, gross fixed capital formation), which globally 
has an import content of 37 %. Unsurprisingly, investment is the only one aggregate de-
mand component, on average, which, in 2014, had not recovered its pre-crisis level, when 
averaged at the global level. This is a reason that might explain the relative slowdown of 
trade, at any given level of import intensity. Moreover, the import intensity of investment 
seemed to have levelled off, if not fallen, in some emerging market economies. While the 
phenomenon has not lasted long enough to be considered as a trend, it could impact the 
shape of trade globalization if it was sustained.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2  looks at the existing literature on the 
topic. Section 3 calculates the import intensity-adjusted demand and discusses the results. 
Section 4 looks at the impact of global value-chains (GVCs) in the global trade slowdown, 
and finds that it seemed to have played a limited role.
1. Literature
The global economic recovery following the 2008–2009 financial crisis has been unu-
sually weak on nearly all fronts. It involved both slower-than-expected growth domesti-
cally in developed and developing economies, as well as weaker links between these coun-
tries, as reflected in the reduction of the rate of growth of international capital and trade 
flows relative to the pre-crisis state [International Monetary Fund…, 2016]. The weakness 
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in economic activity, initially confined to European countries (during the crisis of the eu-
ro-zone in 2011–2013) [Christodoulopoulu, Tkacevs, 2014; Giordano, Zollino, 2016] has 
been spreading to emerging market economies (2014–2016), some of which fell in reces-
sion (Brazil, Russia). Economic activity also softened in China, as prior excesses unwind, 
and the economy is rebalancing into a consumption-based one [Cheung et al., 2012]. 
Economists have looked at many “supply-side” factors for explaining such slowdown, 
suspecting “structural” factors to hold back overall economic growth, such as slow de-
mographic trends, the “deleveraging” of public and private debt, secular stagnation, and 
increasing concerns about the impact of new technologies on employment. In this back-
ground, the stronger slowdown of trade relative to that of GDP has been much com-
mented, with the literature focusing on the reasons for such a drop in the income / output 
elasticity of trade.
The composition of trade has been examined as an important factor in the literature 
of the 2000’s, both with the expansion of global value chains, and the availability of more 
granular data. Based on moving averages, figure 1 shows the acceleration of trade relative 
to output from the late 1980’s to mid-2000’s. The literature emphasised the increased abil-
ity of large companies to allocate tasks across countries according to comparative advan-
tage as a potential reason for this strong trade growth. This process was helped by other 
factors such as the liberalization of trade and investment policies, falling transportation 
and other trade costs, and the declining relative prices of tradable goods [Wu, 2005]. As 
a result, the ratio of traded goods relative to GDP had increased for both developing and 
developed countries.
With growing trade and investment linkages between increasingly economically-
integrated regions, the effects of lower demand in one of the world’s main economy spilled-
over exponentially to partner economies through lower imports. Still, the way in which 
the US recession turned into a “great trade collapse” in 2009  surprised the economist 
community. [Levchenko, Lewis, Tesar, 2010]. This event led to significant research. 
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Figure 1. The relationship between GDP and world trade (exports) growth rates, 10 year moving aver-
ages
S o u r c e :  WTO International Trade Statistics, IMF World Economic Outlook for GDP at market exchange rates. 
URL: https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/statis_e.htm (accessed: 06.09.2017); http://www.imf.org/en/Publica-
tions/WEO/Issues/2017/04/04/world-economic-outlook-april-2017 (accessed: 07.09.2017).
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Subsequently, economists also went in search for the way the income elasticity slowed 
down significantly, during the following period of slow economic recovery (2011–2015). 
The elasticity between real GDP growth and trade had fallen to (barely) 1, raising questions 
about peak trade, de-globalization, and demand spill-overs. Comparisons were made with 
previous periods of unit or less than unit elasticity, which had been marked by a combina-
tion of recession, protectionism and non-cooperative economic policies, notably during 
the 1970s to mid-1980s. Articles argued that economic crises had muting effects on trade, 
which may eventually persist in the medium term [Freund, 2009]. When looking at the 
dense literature of the past 7-to-8 years, one could look at the following contributions.
Baldwin provided a forum and a summary of the early and rich literature on the 
“great trade collapse” [The Great Trade Collapse…, 2009]. He highlighted the convergence 
of views on the central role of real final demand [Bems et al., 2013]. The effect of falling 
demand had been amplified by the existence of highly integrated and synchronized pro-
duction networks [Di Giovanni, Levchenko, 2010; Yi, 2009], which eventually contributed 
to spread the effects of stumbling trade-intensive durable goods. 
The role of demand, and that of the composition of trade, was also highlighted by 
Eaton with co-authors [Eaton et al., 2016]. They calculated that two thirds of the drop in 
trade, relative to GDP, could be attributed to the shift in spending away from manufac-
tures, particularly from durables. Alessandria, Kaboski and Midrigan [Alessandria et al., 
2010] also argued that a strong inventory adjustment had taken place in the industries 
in which the demand shock was the greatest. On the whole, other supply-side factors 
accounted for much less of the global trade collapse, although difficulties in obtaining 
(trade) finance were mentioned by Amiti and Weinstein [Amiti, Weinstein, 2011], Chor 
and Manova [Chor, Manova, 2012] and Auboin [Auboin, Engemann, 2014]. Other fac-
tors, such as the increased use of protectionism, have also been highlighted by Evenett 
[Evenett, 2009; Evenett, Fritz, 2015] and Bown [Bown, 2016].
Constantinescu, Mattoo and Ruta [Constantinescu et al., 2015] suggested that while 
short term determinants such as weak global demand were dominant during the financial 
crisis and the first year of the recovery, the decline of the long-run world trade elastic-
ity (and of trade growth in general) — which started out in the early 2000’s according to 
the authors — explained more than half of the 2012–2013 global trade slowdown. This 
decline in the long-term elasticity of trade could be attributed, according to the authors, 
to the slowing pace of international vertical specialization (global value chains) rather 
than increasing protection or the changing composition of trade and GDP. Among other 
evidences, they considered that the post-crisis reduction of the gap between the trade-
to-income elasticities for value-added and gross trade suggested that global value chain 
expansion was slowing down.
In the line of thoughts developed by Eaton with co-authors [Eaton et al., 2016], Bus-
sière with co-authors [Bussière et al., 2013] adopted an original approach to incorporate 
the changing patterns of trade into the analysis of demand. Rather than using a standard 
demand model, which prediction value had considerably declined since the global trade 
collapse, they constructed an import-intensity-adjusted measure of aggregate demand. 
This measure weights each component of aggregate expenditure (consumption, govern-
ment expenditure, fixed capital investment, exports) by their import intensity, computed 
from OECD input-output tables. 
Looking at data from 18 OECD countries in the period 1985–2011, their model, in-
corporating the import-intensity measure, explained 80 % of the average fall in imports of 
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the G7 countries’ imports during the great trade collapse. The authors denied any “puzzle” 
in the fall of world trade observed during the financial crisis, and concluded that “trade 
fell mostly because demand crashed globally and did so particularly in its most import-
intensive component” [Bussière et al., 2012].
Beyond the improved prediction performance of their model, their methodology in-
troduced an element of trade dynamics in demand-based modelling — with the weights 
increasing during periods of rising dependence of output on imported input, while fall-
ing during less trade-intensive periods (for example the current transition of the Chinese 
economy towards a more consumption and service-based economy). 
Bussière’s and co-authors methodology was used in the most recent contributions on 
the decline in trade income elasticities. The IMF [International Monetary Fund…, 2016] 
found that “the overall weakness in economic activity and aggregate demand, in particular 
in investment, has been the primary restraint on trade growth, accounting for up to three-
fourths of the overall slowdown.” Using the import-intensity measure of demand as part 
of their import demand model, they explained three-quarters of the global goods import 
growth decline in the period 2012–2015, relative to the period 2003–2007, by changes in 
economic activity. They also found that the predicted values for the period 2012–2015 on 
world imports were higher than the actual — this was especially true for goods relative to 
services. They called the difference between the two the “missing import growth”. 
Most of this “missing import growth” was found to be in developing economies, sug-
gesting that the weak economic activity and its composition was unable to fully account 
for the recent slowdown in trade, especially in these countries. While the impact of other 
factors was generally limited, they found that the decline in the growth of global value 
chains in the observed slowdown was significant.
Haugh with co-authors [Haugh et al., 2016] and the ECB [European Central Bank…, 
2016] showed relatively similar findings in different proportions. The result of Haugh with 
co-authors [Haugh et al., 2016] regressions suggested that weak demand, on the one hand, 
as captured by output gaps and investment growth, and the slowdown in global value 
chains expansion, on the other, accounted for roughly equal proportions to the global 
trade slowdown (about 40 % each). The third largest factor was the slowdown in the pace 
of trade liberalization. 
The ECB [European Central Bank…, 2016] emphasized these two categories, struc-
tural (global value chains) and non-structural (the demand channel). The non-structural 
category, re-named compositional changes, encompassed both the shift of growth in trade 
and economic activity towards economies with lower trade intensity (i.e. developing and 
emerging economies), and changes in the composition of aggregate demand towards less 
trade intensive-component. The other source of change is related to structural factors such 
as less reliance on GVCs and the growth of protectionism. According to the ECB, com-
positional effects explained a bigger half of the decline in the global income elasticity of 
trade, while structural factors accounted for the smaller half. 
2. Calculating the import intensity-adjusted demand
2.1. Methodology and data
Like previous other papers, it seemed particularly interesting to follow the innovation 
introduced by Bussière with co-authors [Bussière et al., 2013] with a view to updating 
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and improving it. The fact that using the trade-weighted shares of aggregate expenditure 
components improves the prediction value of demand-based import models indicated 
that the import-component of demand plays an increasing role in explaining the cyclical 
behaviours of the economies selected into the sample. 
Methodology
In this section, it is explained how the total import content of final demand expenditure 
(private consumption, gross fixed capital formation, government consumption and exports) 
was computed, by using Input-Output tables. The details of such methodology are laid out 
in the Appendix Box. In a second step, by weighting each component of expenditure in 
each economy with its import content, the import-intensity adjusted demand (IAD) was 
calculated. The total value of imports for each expenditure component is given by the 
sum of imports of final goods and services for final use / demand, i.e. direct imports, and 
imports of inputs required by domestic industries to produce an output which will either 
be absorbed domestically or exported (indirect import). 
For each expenditure component k, national Input-Output tables are used to calculate 
the value of direct imports )( dirkM  and the value of indirect imports )(
indir
kM . The total 
value of imports of each expenditure component (Mk) is then given by: 
 ,indirk
dir
kk MMM +=  
   (1)
with k= Private consumption, Government consumption, Investment, Exports. 
The total import content of each expenditure component k (ωk) is then calculated by 
dividing the total value of imports of each expenditure component k (Mk) by the total final 
demand for domestic output (value added) plus imports, for the respective expenditure 
component (Fk):
 .
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Where, the total import content of each expenditure component (ωk) is the sum of the 
direct 
 
( dirkω ) and indirect (
ind
kω ) import contents. The indirect import content of each 
aggregate expenditure component represents the share of intermediate imported inputs 
per unit of final demand (for the rest of the paper it will be referred to as indirect imports). 
The direct import content represents the share of imported final goods and services per 
unit of final demand (this will be referred to in the rest of the paper as direct imports)2 .
The import-intensity-adjusted demand (IAD) was thus constructed country-by-
country as a weighted average of traditional aggregate demand components:
2 Note that the direct import content of exports is zero as we excluded re-exports of goods and 
services from our analysis. The author is mindful that for some countries, such as China and other emerging 
economies, this assumption might be a bit problematic due to the high amount of processing trade; therefore 
in these countries we are likely to bias downward the total import content of exports. 
Вестник СПбГУ. Экономика. 2018. Т. 34. Вып. 1 65
 , , , ,ln ln ln ln ln ,t C t t G t t I t t X t tIAD C G I X= ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ω ω ω ω   (4)
where: C stands for private consumption, G for government consumption, I for invest-
ment and X for exports. The weights (ωk,t, with k = C, G, I, X) are the total import content 
of each of the four final demand expenditure components for goods and services (C, G, I 
or X) and they are constructed as explained above. Weights are time varying and normal-
ised in each year so that they sum up to 1. 
As indicated in IMF (2016), “this approach explicitly account for differences in the 
import content of the aggregate demand components and captures the effects of changes 
in the overall strength of economic activities and across its drivers”. While Bussière et 
al. (2013)  made such calculation for 18  OECD countries, we have extended it to a set 
of 38  countries, accounting for more than 75 % of world trade in real terms, in 2015. 
Such calculations incorporated in particular developing countries that are not members 
of the OECD, such as the “BRIC” (Brazil, Russian Federation, India and China) and other 
emerging market economies in Asia and Latin America. 
By doing so, we have been mindful that the recent rebalancing of some important 
developing economies (such as the People’s Republic of China) away from investment and 
manufacturing, towards consumption and services, was likely to reduce the import inten-
sity of demand in these countries. Another expectation was that, over time, with globaliza-
tion, the trade-intensity of some demand components such as exports and investment was 
increasing. For consumption and government expenditure, it seemed that the increase 
might have been slower although this depended on the level of openness of economies and 
participation to trade agreements (in particular those agreement promoting more open 
and efficient procurement practices).
Data 
Bussière with co-authors [Bussière et al., 2013] calculations of import content of final 
demand expenditures were limited by the shortage of input-output data for years before 
1995 and after 2005. At the time of their work, the OECD input-output (I-O) database 
provided data for only three benchmark years, 1995, 2000 and 2005. With I-O tables be-
ing available only every five years, the authors interpolated linearly the available points 
to construct weights for other years. For the period after 2005, the authors simply used 
the 2005 data forward. Since then, the World Input-Output Database (WIOD) has been 
created under an EU-funded project and made available to users. We therefore decided to 
use WIOD data, not the least because OECD I-O tables, which do not contain new data, 
would have meant a significant loss of information (weights have varied quite a bit since 
2005) relative to the WIOD. 
In this paper, the latest delivery of the WIOD database, the 2016 edition contain-
ing 2014 as the last available data year, has been used. The WIOD database contains an-
nual time-series of world input-output tables, comprising national input-output tables 
connected by bilateral international trade flows. By comparison, OECD I-O tables and 
the Trade in Value Added database (TiVA) only compiled data for particular benchmark 
years. The WIOD also covers 43 countries including all 28 EU countries, the United States, 
Japan, Canada, and the main emerging market economies (including the so-called BRIC). 
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The WIOD database provides a model for the rest-of-the-world3. We were able to 
calculate the annual import content of the four components of aggregate demand for 
38 out of the 43 countries in the WIOD database, from 1995 to 2014 (5 countries did not 
have a full set of national accounts, so import intensity indicator by demand component 
could not be calculated). These 38 countries accounted for around 83 % of world GDP 
and 76 % of world trade volume in 20154. The results of our calculations are presented in 
figures 3, 4, 5 and 6 below. 
2.2. Results
2.2.1. Import weights and content
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the average total import content of the four GDP ex-
penditure components (private consumption, government expenditure, gross fixed capi-
tal formation and exports) in the 38 countries analysed, over the period 1995–2014. The 
most pro-cyclical components of aggregate demand, i.e. investment, exports and private 
consumption, are also found to be most import intensive; net government expenditures 
are less so. 
Investment is the most import-intensive component of domestic demand, with an 
average import content (for all 38 countries) of 37 % between 1995 and 2014, although 
the overall import content of exports and of private consumption have been the two 
components of demand growing the fastest over this period. The general increase in 
the import content of aggregate demand reflects the growing openness of most national 
economies, falling trade costs, and international production fragmentation. 
There was a drop in import-intensity during the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, 
followed by a very slow recovery afterwards. Since then, investment has continued to be 
the most import-intensive component of GDP but seemed to have levelled off for some 
emerging market economies; the import intensity of exports and private consumption 
slightly increased in recent years (see figure 2). 
Figure 3  shows that the import content of aggregate demand components varies 
across countries. For smaller, outward-oriented economies, the import content of exports 
is particularly high (Belgium, Luxembourg). It is lower for countries with substantial 
exports in natural resources since these activities require fewer intermediate goods in the 
production process.
Figure 4 details the evolution of import intensities for three major trading nations, 
the USA, China and Japan. Relative to other advanced economies, the United States and 
3 In addition, the WIOD has been constructed in a clear conceptual framework on the basis of official-
ly published input-output tables in conjunction with national accounts and international trade statistics and 
therefore, it ensures a high level of data quality, partially at the expense of coverage in term of the number of 
countries covered. The industry classification of the WIOD 2016 release is based on the ISIC Rev. 4 system 
and it covers 56 sectors:  including agriculture, mining, construction, utilities, manufacturing industries, 
and services industries.
4 For 2015 we assumed the same import content as in 2014. The 38 countries included in this paper’s 
analysis are: 26 European countries  (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Esto-
nia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Netherland, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, UK) and 12 other major countries 
(Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Korea, Turkey, and the 
United States).
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Japan display lower import intensities, reflecting the large pool of domestic intermediate 
suppliers. However in Japan, the import content of all aggregate demand components has 
been rising significantly over the past two decades. The import content of investment and 
private consumption, in particular, increased fourfold between 1995 and 2014 (figure 4). 
In China the import intensity of GDP components has followed a different pattern. 
Import-contents peaked in mid-2000s and have followed a downward trend since then, 
despite a short-lived recovery in 2010–2011. This declining trend in the import content 
since 2005 might partly reflect the rebalancing of China’s economic growth towards the 
domestic consumption of non-tradables, mostly services (rent, business and private 
services in particular). On the production side, this rebalancing has coincided with the 
rapid expansion of the services sectors, which is less import and investment intensive, 
relative to manufacturing (with the earlier outpacing the later in 2015). 
2.2.2. Import adjusted demand (IAD)
As indicated just above, import-intensity-adjusted demand (IAD) is the weighted av-
erage of aggregate demand components multiplied by their import contents (weights). 
Table below shows annual changes for IAD relative to real GDP and real imports of goods 
and services (M) for advanced economies, on the one hand, and developing and emerg-
ing economies, on the other, over the entire sample period. Blended by imports, IAD is a 
measure of demand which is somewhat more volatile than GDP. 
Figure 5 shows that in the BRIC, IAD growth had been slower than real GDP growth 
in recent years. A similar trend was observed in developed economies, as a result of lower 
growth in investment and exports, which are the two most import / trade intensive ele-
ments of economic activity (as shown in section 2.2.1).
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Figure 4. Selected economies’ evolution over time of import content of main GDP components 
S o u r c e :  WIOD Input-Output tables and author calculations. URL: http://www.wiod.org/database/wiots16 
(accessed: 24.08.2017).
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Table. Descriptive statistics (1995–2014)
Indicators GDP IAD M
Advanced economies
Mean 2.4 3.2 5.2
Std. Dev. 3.3 5.0 7.9
Min –16.0 –27.1 –38.1
Max 11.2 18.2 25.9
Obs 520 520 520
Developing and emerging economies
Mean 3.9 4.9 7.1
Std. Dev. 4.0 6.5 11.8
Min –14.1 –26.4 –52.2
Max 21.4 20.6 32.0
Obs 240 240 240
Note: The table presents descriptive statistics from the log difference of GDP, IAD, 
real import of goods and services (M). All values are reported in percent unit. The dataset 
covers annual data from 1995 to 2015 for 38 countries. 
S o u r c e :  WIOD Input-Output tables and author calculations. URL: http://www.
wiod.org/database/wiots16 (accessed: 24.08.2017).
Figure 5. GDP and IAD for BRIC
S o u r c e :  WIOD input-output table and authors’ estimates. World Development Indicator (WDI) (World 
Bank). URL: http://wdi.worldbank.org/table (accessed: 15.08.2017); http://www.wiod.org/database/wiots16 (accessed: 
24.08.2017).
Years
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2.2.3. Why is investment so important?
Gross fixed investment has the highest import content among the components of 
aggregate demand, and has been weak in many advanced economies since the end of the 
financial crisis — it is actually the only component of aggregate demand which has still 
not fully recovered, as shown in figure 6.
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Figure 6. Investment to GDP ratio: advanced versus emerging and developing countries 
S o u r c e :  [International Monetary Fund…, 2016]. 
Note: Country-level data are weighted by GDP valued at purchasing power parities (PPPs) as a share of group GDP. 
Gross fixed investment in emerging and developing countries has been more resil-
ient in the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis, though. It continued to increase 
strongly until 2012, thus stagnated in 2013–2014, before falling as a share of GDP in these 
countries (particularly corporate investment), as show in figure 6. In the specific cases of 
China and Russia, though, the share of investment in GDP has been declining for a longer 
period, contrary to other elements of demand such as government expenditure or con-
sumption, thereby clearly driving down import growth in these countries. 
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4. Other factors behind the trade slowdown:  
the case of global value chains
Some have argued that the expansion of GVCs has come to an end, because protec-
tionism had risen, producers had exhausted efficiency gains, and / or wage-to-productivity 
gaps had closed up. However, the impact of GVCs on the recent trade slowdown is difficult 
to measure in part because of large delay in data availability (notably in the construction 
of the GVC participation index)5. 
Constantinescu, Mattoo and Ruta [Constantinescu et al., 2015] highlighted the role 
of a lesser expansion in global value chains showing the closing gap between the long-run 
elasticities of value added trade with respect to income and the (gross) trade elasticities 
since 2000s. The IMF [International Monetary Fund…, 2016] constructed a GVCs partici-
pation measure using Eora input-output tables. The authors found that a 10 % increase in 
participation in GVCs was associated with a 1 % increase in real import growth. 
The ECB [European Central Bank…, 2016] also found that changes in GVC partici-
pation had played a role in the fluctuations in the global trade-income elasticity, raising 
the elasticity by 0.3 in the 2000s. However, ECB authors did not find that GVCs had con-
tributed to the lower elasticity since the Great Recession. 
The emerging GVC data suggests that 2015 could have seen a decline in GVC trade, 
but the longer period covered by most of the recent analysis does not support the claim. 
This is something to be watched and monitored closely in the future. The analysis of trad-
ed intermediates, shown below, suggests that they remain a very stable share of total trade 
volume once correcting for price and value changes. Thus in analysing detailed interme-
diate trade, one cannot infer a decline in the goods used in GVCs leading the trade slow 
down, but rather moving with the trade slowdown. 
Emerging economies, which were the driving force in trade and economic growth 
in recent decades, have been greatly affected by the sharp declines in commodity prices. 
Some analysts also think that global value chains have been contracting as production, 
in some cases, was returning to domestic markets and as China was moving up the value 
chain. In fact, the share of parts and components in world manufactured goods trade has 
been relatively flat, while a modest decline in the share of intermediate goods in world 
trade is mostly explained by price movements (commodities and exchange rates) in 2015. 
Despite the relatively flat trend in world trade in 2015, underlying GVC trade pat-
terns are evolving somewhat. China continues to export high technology products with 
foreign inputs but lower technology production is shifting to regional neighbours. De-
clining intra-regional intermediate goods trade in the Europe measured in dollars is also 
mostly due to the sharp 13 % appreciation of the dollar against major currencies in 2015. 
Two simple measures of the extent of global value chains are (1) the share of interme-
diate goods trade in world merchandise trade, and (2) the share of parts and component 
trade in world manufactured goods trade. The evolution of these shares is rather stable 
over the period 2000–2015. 
One way to account for the strong oil price fluctuations in recent years is to recal-
culate the shares excluding fuels from both intermediate goods and total merchandise 
trade (see figure 7). The resulting shares are slightly lower but the overall pattern of ups 
5 The TiVA database for example is only available until 2011. 
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and downs remains the same since other commodity prices also rose and fell during this 
period in line with oil prices. 
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Figure 7. Intermediate goods and parts and components shares in world trade, 2000–2015, % 
S o u r c e :  UN Comtrade database. URL: https://comtrade.un.org/pb/CommodityPagesNew.aspx?y=2015 (acces-
sed: 25.08.2017).
Note: Parts and components are defined as the sum of BEC categories 42 and 53. 
Figure 8. Intermediate goods and parts and components shares in world trade accounting for US dollar 
effective exchange rate, 2000–2015, %
S o u r c e :  UN Comtrade database for trade URL: https://comtrade.un.org/pb/CommodityPagesNew.aspx?y=2015 
(accessed: 25.08.2017); Federal Reserve for US dollar effective exchange rates URL: https://www.federalreserve.gov/re-
leases/h10/current/ (accessed: 23.08.2017). 
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Restricting the attention to the share of parts and components in manufactured 
goods trade eliminates primary products from the equation entirely. In this case, there is 
no decline in 2014–15. In all cases the shares are quite stable over time. The unadjusted 
share of intermediates in world trade ranges between 54 % and 59 %, with its value in 
2015 roughly equal to its value in 2000. Meanwhile, the share of parts and components is 
remarkably stable at around 35 % for the entire period from 2000 to 2015.
The fact that most trade statistics are measured in US dollar also contributes to the 
fluctuating shares since exchange rate movements affect regions and products to varying 
degrees. Figure 8 shows the trade shares of intermediate goods and parts and components 
with the influence of the dollar purged by ordinary least squares regression. The results are 
similar to those shown in figure 8 only slightly smoother, particularly in the early 2000.
Conclusion
This paper highlights the role of the import intensity of aggregate demand in the 
overall trends of trade flows, in particular in the role such intensity for some demand 
components to explain the recent global trade slowdown. The findings presented in 
this paper confirm recent publications. While the trade slowdown may be essentially 
explained by demand factors, global value chains (GVCs) are also changing. However, to 
date, the share of intermediate goods and parts and components remains relatively stable, 
although it is likely that within GVCs, a regional re-allocation of task is probably taking 
place according to shifts in comparative advantage and flows of foreign direct investment. 
In the future, though, such analyses are likely to benefit from the current efforts to 
improve world input-output databases. We were able to rely on data covering 38 countries 
accounting for 76 % of global imports. Hopefully, the WIOD or similar databases will help 
getting closer to all of global trade, a difficult undertaking though. 
While in the past decade a significant share of the literature on trade has focused on 
global value chains and its implications, this paper is a reminder that, in the end, trade is 
demand-driven. The weakness of domestic demand, in particular investment, has been 
a feature of the post-2008  financial crisis environment. Within domestic demand, low 
investment has had many implications, not only for global trade, but also for productivity 
and potential output growth, which have proved to be significantly lower than in the 
previous decade. Current research should focus on the relations between the investment 
content of GDP, technology, growth and globalization.
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Импорт как элемент совокупного мирового спроса
М. Обойн 
World Trade Ogranization (WTO), Rue de Lausanne 154, Geneva 2, CH-1211, Switzerland 
Для цитирования: Auboin M. What is the import intensity of global aggregate demand? // Вестник 
СПбГУ. Экономика. 2018. Т. 34. Вып. 1. С. 59–76. https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu05.2018.103
В то время как авторы многих исследований анализируют воздействие международной 
торговли на предложение, обращая внимание в первую очередь на вертикальную спе-
циализацию и глобальные производственные системы, значительно меньше работ по-
священо влиянию, которое импорт оказывает на совокупный спрос. Между тем вплоть 
до финансового кризиса 2008–2009 гг. значение данного фактора росло. В последующие 
годы импортные составляющие отдельных компонентов совокупного спроса демон-
стрировали различную динамику. На основе использования таблиц «затраты — вы-
пуск» по 40 странам, на которые приходится основная часть международной торгов-
ли, в данной статье рассчитаны показатели доли импорта в компонентах совокупного 
спроса за период 1995–2014  гг. Автор настоящей статьи приходит к  выводу, что эта 
доля выше в более подверженных циклическим колебаниям компонентах совокупного 
спроса — инвестициях, экспорте и личном потреблении, и ниже в  государственных 
расходах. Самый высокий показатель, составляющий 37 %, имеют  инвестиции. При 
этом именно инвестиции являются единственным компонентом совокупного спроса, 
который на данный момент еще не достиг своего докризисного уровня. Этим, в част-
ности, можно объяснить замедление темпов роста международной торговли, наблю-
даемое после финансового кризиса. Более того, стагнация импортной составляющей 
совокупного спроса характерна для стран с формирующимися рынками. Данное еще 
недостаточно изученное обстоятельство может оказать большое влияние на процесс 
глобализации торговли. 
Ключевые слова: международная торговля, инвестиции, торговая политика, деловые 
циклы, глобальные производственные системы.
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